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Introduction
In the presence of corruption we would expect citizens to 
develop negative orientations towards political institutions 
and to withdraw their support from corrupt politicians. 
However, empirical studies do not provide a univocal 
answer about the impact of corruption. Most studies iden-
tify a positive correlation between corruption, corruption 
scandals and different forms of political discontent 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Bowler and Karp, 2004). 
However, in the case of the electoral punishment of corrupt 
politicians, the identified effects of corruption range from 
null to moderate (Jiménez and Caínzos, 2006).
We argue that there are three reasons that could explain 
the diverging findings between studies of political attitudes 
and political behaviour. First, due to the mutual causality 
between measures of corruption and attitudes, previous stud-
ies might overestimate the negative effects of corruption on 
political attitudes. Second, the impact of corruption on atti-
tudes might be limited in time. After a corruption scandal is 
uncovered individuals might develop negative attitudes 
towards politicians, but these attitudes might quickly 
recover afterwards. Third, the attitudes of individuals who 
sympathize with the corrupt politicians might not be affected 
by their wrongdoings (Anduiza et al., 2013).
To assess these three possibilities, we exploit a natural 
experiment generated by the coincidence of the uncovering 
of one of the most relevant corruption scandals to have 
occurred in Spain – the Bárcenas scandal – and the field-
work of the European Social Survey (ESS). The timing of 
the survey is used as a source of exogenous variation in 
corruption, which allows us to assess the causal effect of a 
real-world corruption scandal on trust in politicians. 
Moreover, through this design we can assess whether the 
impact of the scandal decays, and also whether partisanship 
moderates the effect of the scandal.
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Theoretical framework
Corruption scandals make the wrongdoings of politicians 
known to the public. Confronted with these cases, individu-
als should update their attitudes towards politicians based on 
their judgement of the behaviour of political authorities. This 
is the hypothesis put forward by institutional theories, which 
posit that attitudes like trust in politicians are endogenous to 
the political system and depend on what political authorities 
do (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Institutions that perform well 
and produce desirable outputs should garner support, while 
the misuse of public office should lead to distrust.
In line with institutional theories, studies have identified 
a positive correlation between corruption, corruption scan-
dals and political discontent. Anderson and Tverdova 
(2003), Mishler and Rose (2001) and Villoria et al. (2013) 
uncover a negative association between aggregate meas-
ures of corruption, individual-level perceptions of corrup-
tion and individuals’ political support. Studies addressing 
the impact of specific corruption scandals have also 
revealed a negative effect of corruption (Bowler and Karp, 
2004; Chanley et al., 2000). The negative impact of scan-
dals is, however, not restricted to corruption. Kumlin and 
Esaiasson’s (2012) comprehensive analysis of scandals in 
Europe reveals that different types of political scandals 
generate political discontent (see Rottinghaus, 2014 for an 
overview of the US literature).
Contrasting with the literature on political attitudes, 
studies that analyse the electoral performance of politicians 
involved in corruption scandals have only identified a mod-
est, or even null, effect of corruption on the electoral for-
tunes of these politicians. Voters seem to forgive corrupt 
politicians since they are usually re-elected (Golden, 2006; 
Jiménez and Caínzos, 2006). Corruption has a mild effect 
on the electoral support of corrupt politicians across differ-
ent contexts like Spain (Riera et al., 2013), Germany 
(Kauder and Potrafke, 2015), or Italy (Golden, 2006).
There are three possibilities that could help explain the 
diverging findings in studies of political attitudes and 
political behaviour. The first possibility is that the impact 
of corruption on attitudes like political distrust might have 
been overestimated. In previous studies corruption was 
often operationalized through measures of scandal recall 
or perceived corruption, either at the individual level 
through survey items (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Villoria 
et al., 2013), or at the aggregate level with indicators like 
the Corruption Perceptions Index, which are also gauged 
through cross-sectional individual-level surveys (Anderson 
and Tverdova, 2003). The findings of these studies are 
likely to be biased due to the mutual causality between per-
ceptions of corruption, scandal recall and political trust. 
High perceptions of corruption, scandal recall and institu-
tional mistrust generate a vicious circle of mutual rein-
forcement that increases the difficulty of disentangling the 
causal effect of corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010).
Longitudinal and experimental designs can overcome 
the endogeneity problems of cross-sectional designs. 
However, one of the drawbacks of longitudinal studies is 
that the measurement of attitudes is made months or even 
years after the corruption scandal occurred (Chanley et al., 
2000; Pharr, 2000). This is problematic since the effects of 
scandals are likely to weaken over time (see below). With 
regards to experimental designs, while they provide robust 
evidence of a causal effect of corruption on political atti-
tudes (Anduiza et al., 2013; Maier, 2011), their external 
validity is limited. Since it is problematic to credibly 
manipulate real corruption scandals, most experimental 
research focuses on fictitious scandals. Therefore, any evi-
dence on the effects of real corruption scandals on repre-
sentative samples of the population is, thus far, limited.
We rely on a quasi-experimental design to overcome some 
of these limitations and analyse if real-world corruption scan-
dals can influence trust in politicians. Drawing on institu-
tional theories, and based on the premise that corruption 
scandals signal an abuse of the power entrusted by citizens to 
political authorities, we expect that these scandals will under-
mine trust in politicians. If a scandal involves high-ranking 
government officials, citizens should update their trust in 
politicians. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H1: Exposure to relevant and salient corruption scandals 
will reduce trust in politicians
Even if corruption scandals affect political attitudes, 
these scandals might not entail an electoral defeat of cor-
rupt politicians if they have only a short-term effect on atti-
tudes that has vanished by the time elections take place. 
The literature on media effects suggests that this might be 
the case, since the information conveyed in the media only 
exerts a short-term influence on public opinion (Gerber et 
al., 2011). In fact, studies indicate that the effects of politi-
cal communications decay quickly (Hill et al., 2013). 
Moreover, if we also take into account that individuals tend 
to base their political opinions on top-of-the-head consid-
erations (Zaller, 1992), we can expect that corruption scan-
dals should inform individuals’ trust in politicians to a 
greater extent in the weeks following their disclosure. Since 
the coverage of scandals should be more extensive just 
after they have been uncovered, scandal-related considera-
tions should be more salient on individuals’ minds during 
those days. Therefore, the effect of corruption scandals on 
political attitudes might be only short term (but cf. Doherty 
et al., 2014). This leads us to our second hypothesis:
H2: The negative effect of corruption scandals on trust in 
politicians will be stronger in the days following their 
disclosure and will decay over time
The influence of corruption scandals on political atti-
tudes and elections could also be mitigated if individuals 
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react differently to scandals depending on their pre-existing 
attitudes. Individuals’ predispositions, like their partisan-
ship, make them react differently to political information 
(Zaller, 1992). Those who identify with the party involved 
in a scandal are likely to filter the information they receive 
and attribute lower importance to that scandal. Anduiza et 
al. (2013) have shown that partisanship moderates toler-
ance towards corruption. Individuals are likely to judge the 
corrupt actions of politicians less severely if they are com-
mitted by politicians of the party they support. Therefore, 
partisanship might condition how individuals react to a cor-
ruption scandal. This leads us to our final hypothesis:
H3: The negative effects of corruption scandals on trust 
in politicians will be  weaker among the supporters of 
the party involved in the scandal
The Bárcenas case
The Bárcenas case is one of the most relevant corruption 
scandals occurred in Spain in the last decade. It became 
widely known when the newspaper El País leaked internal 
documents from the Partido Popular (PP) on 31 January 
2013. The documents leaked by El País were facsimiles 
written by Luis Bárcenas (the treasurer of the party) which 
indicated that the party had received illegal contributions 
that were used to pay cash bonuses to high-ranking mem-
bers of the party, among other irregularities. After the pub-
lication of these documents by El País, news of the scandal 
was widely covered by national and international televi-
sions and newspapers. While news related to Bárcenas had 
already appeared on 18 January in the newspaper El Mundo, 
the leak by El País was the first to suggest that the scandal 
affected not only the treasurer of the party, but also a large 
number of high-ranking members of the PP. In fact, on 4 
February PP Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy admitted that 
‘nothing was true, except for a few things’ (referring to the 
scandal documents).
To have a better picture of how the Bárcenas scandal 
rapidly rose in salience on 31 January, Figure 1 summarizes 
the relative frequencies of Google searches about the scan-
dal. As the graph shows, the maximum peak in searches 
was reached the day El País leaked the bookkeeping docu-
ments. This is consistent with the great salience with which 
this issue was covered in the Spanish media.1 The figure 
also reveals that there was an increase in the number of 
searches when El Mundo presented a piece about Bárcenas, 
but the issue became then less salient only to peak at the 
end of January, coinciding with the disclosure by El País of 
the Bárcenas documents.
Data and methods
The empirical analyses draw on data from the sixth round 
of the ESS, which was fielded in Spain between 23 January 
and 12 May 2013. Following the research design proposed 
by Legewie (2013), we capitalize on the coincidence of the 
uncovering of the Bárcenas scandal and the ESS field-
work.2 Our quasi-experimental identification strategy relies 
on the assumption that the timing at which respondents 
were interviewed is as-if random, so that the uncovering of 
the Bárcenas case provides an exogenous source of varia-
tion for levels of corruption. As such, the day at which the 
interview was conducted assigns respondents to the treat-
ment and control groups. The sample is split so that those 
who were interviewed before the scandal are assigned to 
the control group and those who were interviewed in the 
weeks following the uncovering of the scandal are assigned 
to the treatment group. Therefore, the treatment variable Di 
is operationalized as follows:3
D
D
i
i
=
( )= 0 control group  if subject i was interviewed 
before 31 January 230 respondents
= 1 treatment group  if
( )
( )Di  subject i was 
interviewed between 31 January and 
28 February 1198 respondents( )









An assumption of this identification strategy is that the 
timing of the survey is exogenous, and hence independent 
of other third variables that could affect trust in politicians 
(ignorability assumption). Potential threats to this assump-
tion come from the differential reachability of the sampled 
respondents. If factors that determine reachability are 
related to political trust, there might be systematic differ-
ences in trust that are unrelated to the treatment. To assess 
the plausibility of this assumption, we conduct balance 
tests on several pre-treatment variables.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the balance tests for 
the following pre-treatment covariates: years of education 
completed, gender, age, employment status, and having 
Figure 1. Google trends for the search ‘caso barcenas’.
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voted for the winning party (PP) in the last election.4 Most 
covariates are similarly distributed within the control and 
treatment groups. The only statistically significant differ-
ence between the two groups appears for employment sta-
tus. There are more respondents in paid work in the 
treatment group and more respondents outside of the 
labour market in the control group. There is also a slight 
imbalance between the treatment and control groups with 
regard to age (p-value = 0.06). Overall, these tests suggest 
that the potential selection bias (reachability bias) exerts 
only a minor influence on whether individuals were inter-
viewed before or after the scandal, and provides further 
support for the characterization of the event as a natural 
experiment.
To analyse the effect of the scandal we fit a series of 
OLS regressions in which trust in politicians is specified as 
the dependent variable. Trust in politicians is measured in 
an 11-point scale where 0 means no trust at all and 10 
means absolute trust. Besides the treatment variable Di the 
models also include controls for the pre-treatment covari-
ates summarized in Table 1 and region fixed effects. Region 
fixed effects are included to account for the fact that some 
regions are not present in the control group.
Results
The effect of the corruption scandal (H1)
Figure 2 summarizes the levels of trust in politicians (a 
moving average of 2 days) during the months of January 
and February. The x-axis ranges from −10 to 30, and the 
value 0 corresponds to 31 January. There is a substantial 
drop in trust in politicians on 31 January. Before the 
Bárcenas scandal the average level of trust in politicians 
in the control group is of 2.3 points. After the scandal was 
uncovered, the average trust in the treatment group is of 
1.8 points. Thus, there is a −0.5 difference between the 
two groups, a reduction in trust that is quite remarkable 
given the already low levels of trust of Spanish citizens 
before the scandal.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the regression models. 
The treatment indicator Di of model-1 shows that respondents 
who were interviewed after El País uncovered the Bárcenas 
scandal have, on average, lower trust in politicians. The dif-
ference is of 0.48 points and statistically significant. Model-2 
incorporates the pre-treatment covariates and region fixed 
effects. In this model the difference between those who were 
exposed to the Bárcenas scandal and those who were not is of 
−0.45 points. This difference is larger than the difference 
between election winners and losers, which is a common pre-
dictor of trust in politicians. Hence, in line with our first 
hypothesis, these models indicate that the Bárcenas scandal 
had a substantial negative impact on trust in politicians.
Changes in the treatment effect over time (H2)
To test H2 we estimate a series of regression models in which 
we progressively enlarge the treatment group by 5 days, while 
the control group stays always the same (those interviewed 
before 31 January). For the first estimation, the treatment 
group only comprises those interviewed on the week immedi-
ately following the scandal (31 January to 6 February), for the 
second estimation we also add respondents interviewed in the 
next 5 days (i.e. from 31 January and 11 February). We con-
tinue enlarging the treatment group by 5 days at each estima-
tion until the final date of the fieldwork (12 May) is reached. 
This allows us to analyse if the treatment effects decay as we 
incorporate to the treatment group individuals interviewed 
further away from the day when the scandal was uncovered. 
The model estimated to test this hypothesis is specified with 
the same covariates of model-2.5
Figure 3 summarizes how the estimate for Di changes as 
individuals interviewed at a later point in time are incorpo-
rated to the treatment group. The trend line in Figure 3 dis-
plays a decay of the effect over time. When we restrict the 
treatment group to those interviewed just after the scandal 
was uncovered, the difference in trust in politicians between 
those who were exposed to the scandal and those who were 
not is of 0.50 points. As we incorporate to the treatment 
group individuals interviewed further away from the 
Table 1. Two-sample t-tests.
Variables Mean p-value Valid N
Treatment Control
Years of education 12.57 13.07 0.26 1409
Gender 1.51 1.53 0.59 1428
Age 46.99 49.39 0.06 1428
Employment status:  
 In paid work 0.44 0.35 0.01 1422
 In education 0.09 0.11 0.35 1422
 Unemployed 0.16 0.14 0.47 1422
 Out of the labour market 0.29 0.39 0.01 1422
Election winner 0.27 0.27 0.81 1428
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scandal, the size of the coefficient Di decreases in size. In 
fact, when those interviewed in May are incorporated to the 
treatment group, the effect shrinks to −0.32 and is no longer 
statistically significant. These results support the idea that 
the scandal informed citizens’ evaluations of the trustwor-
thiness of politicians to a greater extent on the weeks that 
followed the publication of the Bárcenas documents.6
Treatment effect heterogeneity (H3)
To analyse the moderating role of partisan predispositions, 
in model-3 of Table 2 we interact the treatment indicator Di 
and the election winner variable, which measures whether 
the respondent voted for the PP in the last national elec-
tions.7 Although partisanship (i.e. being close to PP) would 
be a more adequate indicator of partisan predispositions, 
we rely on the party voted for because partisanship could be 
affected by the corruption scandal. The interaction coeffi-
cient indicates that there are no significant differences in 
the effect of being exposed to the Bárcenas scandal between 
those who voted for PP and those who did not. Hence, con-
trary to our expectations, the effects of the corruption scan-
dal are not moderated by partisanship.
Robustness checks
One of the threats to the ignorability assumption comes 
from the differential reachability of respondents. To assess 
the robustness of our results against this potential bias, we 
include in our analyses information about the number of 
times an individual declined to reply to the survey after 
having been contacted, which serves as a proxy for respond-
ents’ reachability. Our estimates are not altered by the 
inclusion of this variable in our models (Table A2, supple-
mentary materials).8 Moreover, some Spanish regions were 
only surveyed (reached) after treatment. Therefore, we re-
estimate all our models including only regions with 
respondents in both the treatment and control groups. The 
results indicate that our conclusions are not altered when 
considering only these regions (Table A2, supplementary 
materials).
Our identification strategy also assumes that the effect 
of having been interviewed before or after 31 January on 
trust in politicians goes only through the treatment (condi-
tional on covariates). This assumption could be threatened 
by other unobserved factors that might change through time 
and affect trust in politicians. To evaluate this threat, we 
simulate 1000 placebo events that mimic our analyses of 
the Bárcenas scandal (i.e. control group comprises 8 days 
before the event and treatment group comprises 28 days 
after the event) but take place between 1 February and 14 
April. We compare the effects of these placebo events with 
those of the Bárcenas scandal. It is reasonable to expect that 
a small proportion of the simulated events will produce 
results that are similar to the ones obtained with the original 
event, because some simulated events fall close to the date 
Figure 2. Change in trust in politicians at the time of the Bárcenas scandal.
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when the Bárcenas scandal was uncovered. The results of 
the simulation add further plausibility to our causal esti-
mate of the corruption scandal, since only 4.8% of the sim-
ulations produce a negative statistically significant effect 
similar to the one of the Bárcenas scandal (see appendix, 
supplementary materials for further details). Besides the 
simulation, we also assess the impact of the original treat-
ment Di on alternative dependent variables that should not 
be affected by the Bárcenas scandal, for which we do not 
find any significant effect of the treatment (Table A5, sup-
plementary materials).
As an additional robustness check, we replicate our 
analyses using the seventh round of the ESS. Since no cor-
ruption scandal was uncovered during the first days of the 
fieldwork of the seventh round, and interviews started on 
23 January (like in the sixth round), this is an ideal way to 
test that our findings are not driven by aspects related to the 
timing of the fieldwork. We estimate the impact of a ficti-
tious event that occurs on 31 January 2015. The results 
indicate that this event has no impact on trust in politicians 
(Table A6, supplementary materials). Furthermore, since 
the fieldwork of ESS-6 in Denmark coincided with the 
fieldwork in Spain, we follow Pollock et al. (2015) and use 
Denmark as a counterfactual and test the impact of the 
Bárcenas scandal among Danes. The Bárcenas scandal had 
no impact on trust in politicians in Denmark (Table A6, 
supplementary materials).
Finally, we also consider alternative methods to estimate 
the effects of the scandal. We estimate the effects through 
coarsened exact matching and entropy balancing (Blackwell 
et al., 2009; Hainmueller, 2012), as well as through a 
regression discontinuity design. The results obtained with 
these methods lead us to the same conclusions (Tables A7, 
A8 and A9, supplementary materials).
Conclusion
The natural experiment exploited in this paper provided a 
unique opportunity to estimate the causal effect of a real 
corruption scandal on trust in politicians with a great degree 
of internal and external validity. In line with institutional 
theories, our results indicate that the corruption scandal 
Table 2. OLS regression models. Dependent variable: trust in politicians.
Variables Model-1 Model-2 Model-3
D (Exposure to the Bárcenas scandal) –0.483** –0.451** –0.410*
 (0.151) (0.168) (0.193)
Election winner 0.306* 0.430
 (0.130) (0.311)
Election winner*D –0.149
 (0.339)
Female –0.158 –0.157
 (0.112) (0.112)
Years of education 0.027** 0.027**
 (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.009 0.009
 (0.005) (0.005)
Employment status (Ref: In paid work)  
In education 0.698** 0.699**
 (0.228) (0.228)
Unemployed –0.360* –0.359*
 (0.168) (0.169)
Out of the labour market 0.286 0.284
 (0.175) (0.175)
Other –0.565 –0.562
 (0.526) (0.526)
Region fixed effects  
  
Constant 2.224*** 1.155** 1.113**
 (0.138) (0.389) (0.401)
  
Observations 1414 1392 1392
R-squared 0.007 0.051 0.051
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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significantly reduced individuals’ trust in politicians. These 
results diverge from Kumlin and Esaiasson’s (2012), who 
conclude that political scandals involving only one party do 
not influence attitudes towards the political system.
Through our design we also analyse the decay of the 
effect of the scandal. The results indicate that the impact 
of the corruption scandal on political trust was not long-
lasting, since it influenced individuals’ trust in politicians 
more strongly in the weeks immediately following its dis-
closure. This finding might explain why corruption scan-
dals have only a moderate or null influence on the electoral 
fortunes of corrupt politicians. This intuition seems to be 
supported by the performance of the party involved in the 
Bárcenas scandal in the 2015 and 2016 Spanish elections. 
Three years after the scandal was uncovered the PP lost 
some support in these elections but remained the most 
voted party.
Finally, our results indicate that the effect of the corrup-
tion scandal was not weaker among the supporters of the 
party involved in the scandal. The low baseline levels of 
trust in politicians in Spain prior to the scandal, especially 
among those who do not identify with the PP (average = 
2.1), could explain this null finding. Low levels of trust 
might have predated the impact of the scandal for those not 
supporting PP, since for them there was already little trust 
in politicians to be lost before the scandal.
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Notes
1. Mellon (2013) indicates that Google trends are an appropri-
ate measure of issue salience. To assess the extent to which 
Google trends also reflect the attention devoted to a topic 
in the media we correlate the Google trends measure with 
Figure 3. Change in the treatment effect over time.
Note: The x-axis indicates the last day included in the treatment group. Round markers with filling denote coefficients that are statistically significant 
at least at p<0.05. Round makers without filling denote coefficients that are not statistically significant.
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the number of articles mentioning Bárcenas in El País 
(extracted from Lexis/Nexis). The analyses reveal that, in the 
period from 1 January to 15 May the correlation between 
the two equals 0.73 (p<0.001). Moreover, the peak of news 
about Bárcenas occurred precisely between 31 January 
and 5 February, when El País published 174 articles about 
Bárcenas. Hence, for Spain, Google trends appear to be an 
appropriate measure of the salience and attention devoted to 
a certain issue.
2. Solaz et al. (2017) follow this strategy to study the impact of 
the Bárcenas scandal on satisfaction with government.
3. We do not include respondents interviewed after 28 
February in the treatment group because we expect the 
treatment to affect trust in politicians among those who 
were interviewed closer to the date of the treatment. To test 
H2 and validate this intuition we expand the original treat-
ment group and include all respondents interviewed after 
30 January (see below).
4. Details about the coding of all variables can be found in 
appendix A, supplementary materials.
5. We have analysed the balance on pre-treatment covariates 
computing means comparisons between the original control 
group and this enlarged treatment group. We only find sta-
tistically significant differences between the two groups for 
employment status.
6. We conduct additional analyses in which we divide the 
sample into three separate groups: those interviewed before 
31 January, those interviewed between 31 January and 28 
February, and those interviewed between March and May. 
The analyses confirm that the treatment effect decays for 
those interviewed after 28 February (see appendix B, sup-
plementary materials).
7. Among those who did not vote for PP we include those who 
did not vote and those not eligible to vote.
8. The tables summarizing the results of the robustness checks 
can be found in appendix C, supplementary materials.
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